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Introduction
Babette Babich

 he Multidimensionality of Hermeneutic Phenomenology:
T
From Philology Through Science and Technology to Theology
Studies of hermeneutics have historically invoked and even enumerated d imensions1
and hermeneutic phenomenology is inherently multidimensional. In part this is due
to the essential connection between hermeneutics and philology, which , the present
editor—writing as she does as much as a Nietzsche specialist as a Heidegger specialist—cannot overlook.2 But it is also the legacy of Wilhelm Dilthey in particular.
Hence Joseph J. Kockelman’s 2003 Ideas for a Hermeneutic Phenomenology of the
Natural Sciences invokes “The Importance of Methodical Hermeneutics.”3 With
this description, echoing the contributions of his friend and long-time colleague,
Thomas Seebohm, Kockelmans relates Dilthey to Boeckh and thus to the classic
tradition of hermeneutics including but also well in advance of Gadamer.4 Hence
See E. D. Hirsch, Jr. (1972) in addition to the collection edited by Günter Figal and Hans-Helmuth
Gander (2005) as well as an earlier collection featuring both legal and literary contributions,
Winfried Hassemer (1984), in addition to Ronald Bontekoe’s overview (1996), etc.
2
See here the contributions to Helmut Flaschar, Karlfried Gründer and Axel E.-A. Horstmann
(1979). See too for a discussion with reference to Gadamer as well as Husserl and Heidegger,
István Fehér (1999) or (2001).
3
Kockelmans (2003). See for a discussion of Boeckh and Dilthey, Otto Friedrich Bollnow’s (1982)
as well as Thomas M. Seebohm’s monograph (2004) in addition to Seebohm’s (1984). See too
in connection with Boeckh’s teacher, Schleiermacher, E. D. Hirsch, Jr. (1975). In connection
with Nietzsche, although not ascribing particular philological excellence to Nietzsche James
Q. Whitman (1986) as well as Viktor Poschl, “Nietzsche und die klassische Philologie” in: Flaschar,
Gründer and Horstmann (eds.), Philologie und Hermeneutik im 19. Jahrhundert, pp. 141–155 and
more recently Christian Benne (2005).
4
Kockelmans, Joseph (2003). See for a discussion of Boeckh and Dilthey, Otto Friedrich Bollnow’s
(1982) and, adding, methodical hermeneutics, Thomas M. Seebohm’s monograph Hermeneutics:
Method and Methodology (2004) as well as his essay, “Boeckh and Dilthey (1984) and see too in
connection with Boeckh’s teacher, Schleiermacher, E. D. Hirsch, Jr. (1975). Giovanni Leghissa
also includes a discussion of Boeckh in his contribution to the current volume. In connection with
1
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speaking of methodical hermeneutics, what Kockelmans (and to be sure
what Seebohm) understood as hermeneutic phenomenology comprised the full
scope of the scholarly and ‘scientific’ traditions of classical philology just where
philology subsumes not only archaeology but the disciplinary breadth of aesthetics
and history as well as philosophy and theology. In this methodical fashion,
classical philol-ogy—like Husserl’s famous phenomenological call to the
‘things themselves’—refers to nothing less than the words themselves.
Although even otherwise hermeneutically sensitive scholars routinely limit their
conception of Nietzsche to his supposed proclamation of the death of God,5 such a
limitation can steer us awry when it comes to hermeneutics and philology. Nietzsche’s
own hermeneutic phenomenology is clearly expressed in his philological study of
ancient Greek lyric and tragedy out of what Nietzsche called “the spirit of music.”6
Thus philologically, i.e., directed exactly literally to the words themselves, Nietzsche
there undertook to ‘hear’ Greek lyric and tragic poetry, hearing with his eyes as he
described the philological task in question. For Nietzsche, the scope of aesthetics as
he defined it as a science corresponded to the scientific question of his own discipline
of ancient or classical philology. And he had posed this question even before his first
book inasmuch as the critical perspective Nietzsche urges beginning with his inaugural lecture in Basel is also the reason he concludes that lecture with a conversion of
Seneca’s dictum: philology is to become philosophically critical which is also to say
that philology has to be set on the path of a critical science.
In this sense, we can begin to comprehend Nietzsche’s otherwise difficult to
understand self-critique (or self-defense), as he claims that in his first book, The
Birth of Tragedy Out of the Spirit of Music, he found himself grappling with
the very multidimensional problem of science itself: “something frightful and
dangerous, a problem with horns … in any case, a new problem … the problem of
science itself, science considered for the first time as problematic, as questionable.”7
Asking how science, as such, is possible qua science (which is what I have
described as a critical philosophy of science),8 Nietzsche was in this sense the first
to propose a hermeneutics of science.
Nietzsche, although not ascribing particular philological prowess to Nietzsche, James Q. Whitman
(1986) as well as Viktor Poschl, “Nietzsche und die klassische Philologie” in: Flaschar, Gründer
and Horstmann (eds.), Philologie und Hermeneutik im 19. Jahrhundert, pp. 141–155 and more
recently Christian Benne (2005).
5
See Adriann T. Peperzak’s contribution in the essays below in addition to Kockelmans’ own
(1983).
6
See Babich (2005) as well as Christophe Corbier (2009) and see the final chapters of my The
Hallelujah Effect. Philosophical Reflections on Music, Performance Practice and Technology
(Surrey: Ashgate, 2013) for more discussion and further references. Damir Barbarič in his insightful
“Hörendes Denken” in Figal and Gander, eds., “Dimensionen des Hermeneutischen,” pp. 37–58,
explores the question of hearing in an effort to differentiate Heidegger’s rhetorically attuned
hermeneutics from Gadamer’s hermeneutics but he does not raise the question Nietzsche does in
terms of the music of words, that is to say of the sounding of the text.
7
Friedrich Nietzsche (1980a), Vol 1. Hereafter: KSA.
8
Thus see my Babich (2010a, 2009).
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Nietzsche would later address physics itself, characterizing the natural scientist’s
‘interpretation’ of nature as a “lack of philology,”9 invoking (ah, so politely!) his
own scientific expertise or authority (“speaking as an old philologist”), to accuse
natural scientists of misinterpreting their interpretations, that is to say forgetting that
their interpretations corresponded to “interpretation rather than text.”10
In my own Nietzsche-indebted overview of different approaches to continental
philosophy of science—including philosophies of science other than the traditional
preoccupation with physics that characterizes mainstream or analytic philosophy of
science—I discuss both philology and method, echoing Karl Jaspers’ along with
Karl Reinhardt’s additional reflections, in order to argue for the multidimensionality
of the philosophy of science itself: “The Case for -P Philosophies of Science, where
P = Physics.”11
Kockelmans alludes to Nietzsche’s famous reflections on science as i nterpretation
in Beyond Good and Evil, focusing in this case on the issue of text qua text.12 To be
sure, Kockelmans’ own concern was methodical hermeneutics, and like others, he
does not use text as Nietzsche speaks of ‘text,’ i.e., as a metaphor for the object as
such but conventionally or with respect to the traditions of scientific interpretation.
For Nietzsche however, as for Heidegger, the ‘text’ when it comes to natural science
will be its objects, or else, as Patrick Heelan also speaks of these, its instruments, its
‘readable’ technologies.
The relevance of hermeneutics and science in particular must be foregrounded
here as it is central to the current collection but also given the sometimes peripheral
presence of such approaches in mainstream histories and philosophies of sciences.
Although one can also explore this peripherality in terms of the very mainstream
tendency to distinguish the history of science, and its more traditionally text-based or
historiographically hermeneutic orientation, from the philosophy of science and its
traditional orientation to theory and experiment, one can also, as noted above, trace
this back to an old distinction, as Dilthey expresses it, whereby nature, we explain
but the life of the mind we understand: Die Natur erklären wir, das Seelenleben verstehen wir.13 This distinction has been decisive, especially for what would become
today’s analytic and logical positivist philosophies of science (e.g., von Wright’s

Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, §22; KSA 5, 37.
Ibid.
11
See Babich, “Towards a Critical Philosophy of Science,” pp. 359ff. On Nietzsche and Reinhardt
and history, see Wolfgang Müller-Lauter (1999) and see too for a discussion of Löwith and history,
Rodolphe Gasché’s essay in the present collection below.
12
See Kockelmans, Ideas for a Hermeneutic Phenomenology of the Natural Sciences. Volume II,
pp. ix. Kockelmans here refers to Paul van Tongeren’s (2000).
13
Wilhelm Dilthey, Vol. VII (1916–1967), p. 144 See further, Dilthey, Introduction to the Human
Sciences, Princeton: Princeton University Press. Sabine Müller, a philosophical physicist includes
Dilthey along with an explicit reference to hermeneutics in her Programm für eine neue
Wissenschaftstheorie (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2004) but even where Dilthey is not
mentioned by name he remains influential—rather in the Hegelian spirit that tends not to draw
connections to other authors.
9

10
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1971 Explanation and Understanding).14 To this day we continue to contrast the
natural and the human sciences, whereby the natural sciences dominate our ideal
notion of science as science. Hence physics is the pre-eminent or archetypical science (the “-P-sciences” mentioned above accordingly include the philosophy of
chemistry as well as the earth sciences including geology, as well as biology).15 The
human sciences for their part include history and literary studies as well as art history
and theology but they also traditionally include the more quantifiably promising disciplines of psychology, sociology, ethnography and political other social sciences.
Thus in his 1930s Nietzsche lectures, Heidegger highlights the academic tendency to
connect the arts and the sciences, foregrounding less a c onjunction than a contest, an
agonistic tension nicely expressed in Rorty’s pragmatic bon mot as “physics envy.”16
Rorty’s phrase captures the relation to the natural sciences particularly in evidence in
analytic philosophy, evident in the conflict that has in the interim peaked (without
for that being fully resolved) under the rubric of the so-called science wars17 but also
in the ongoing debates on the relevance or irrelevance of philosophy (as expressed
from the point of view of physicists like Stephen Hawking),18 where what counts as
philosophy excludes hermeneutic and phenomenological kinds and is pretty much
defined as Paul or Patricia Churchland define it, i.e., as good will advocates for brain
scans or as dedicated, in P.M.S. Hacker’s more pithy phrase, to “singing the Hallelujah
chorus for the sciences.”19 Indeed, Hawking’s and other scientist’s complaints would
seem to make it plain that the scientists see themselves as perfectly capable of
bandleading on their own behalf.20
Dilthey’s contrast between explication and understanding is a clear one and
articulates an importantly hermeneutic truth when it comes to the relation between
Georg Henrik von Wright (1971).
See my above cited: “Towards a Critical Philosophy of Science” for this distinction and extensive
references to the philosophy of chemistry, including Eric Scerri as well as Jaap van Brakel—whose
work also appears in another context in the present collection—as well as the philosophy of geology, including the work of Rom Harré and Bob Frodeman (and this collection features some of
Frodeman’s work), in addition to the philosophy of biology (and to which Dimitri Ginev’s contribution in this collection also belongs) including the complex case examples of Haeckel and Franz
Moewus as well as Rupert Sheldrake, Lynn Margulis and the molecular cancer researcher and
AIDs epidemiologist, Peter Duesberg.
16
Richard Rorty (1994). See for further references, my discussion “ex aliquo nihil: Nietzsche on
Science, Anarchy, and Democratic Nihilism,” (2010).
17
The science wars were instigated by disgruntled thinkers on the side of physics and traditionally
positivistic philosophy of science. See for complete references and a hermeneutic account Babich
(2002b). As well as the introduction to the same volume: Babich (2002c).
18
Hawking has been saying this for some time—and it is complemented by his ambition to be
heard as a philosophically as well as scientifically in his A Brief History of Time. See for one
account in the popular press: Matt Warman (2011). For this, see Stephen Hawking and Leonard
Mlodinow (2010).
19
In interview with James Garvey (2010). For a measured discussion, see Maxwell R. Bennett and
Peter M. S. Hacker (2003).
20
This I emphasize in an interview: “An Impoverishment of Philosophy.” In: Dennis Erwin and
Matt Story, eds., Purlieu: Philosophy and the University (2011), pp. 37–71.
14
15
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subject and subject in the human sciences. This recurs in Gadamer’s existential
emphasis in his reminder that we always understand otherwise, when we understand,
inasmuch as, in this very Diltheyan sense, understanding is always understanding
another—an other, any other’s—understanding. But despite its clarity and
correctness (as Heidegger distinguishes ontic truth), Nietzsche challenges that
although we may give our science the name of “‘Explanation’… it is ‘description’
that distinguishes us from older stages of knowledge and science. Our descriptions
are better—we do not explain any more than our predecessors.”21 As Nietzsche goes
on to reflect:
How could we possibly explain anything? We operate only with things that do not exist:
lines, planes, bodies, atoms, divisible time spans, divisible spaces. How should explanations be at all possible when we first turn everything into an image, our image!22

Nietzsche later observes that “It is perhaps just dawning on five or six minds that
physics, too, is only an interpretation and exegesis of the world (to suit us, if I may
say so!) and not a world-explanation.”23 Explanation turns out to be all about a
redescription of the unfamiliar in familiar terms, whereby the unknown is able to be
‘taken’ as known, as if known—a point not lost on the neo-Kantian philosopher
Hans Vaihinger.24
In addition to Nietzsche’s hermeneutic and phenomenological thinking,25 the
range of approaches to hermeneutic phenomenology including but not limited to
the philosophy of science characterizes the breadth of not only Martin Heidegger
in his writing on science and technology but also Maurice Merleau-Ponty, in
addition to a range of philosophers of science cutting across the contemporary
analytic continental-divide, where some are patently analytically minded and
others more traditionally, or classically, continentally framed. The term can be
applied, arguably—by which I mean descriptively—to many including, among
sociologists and even poets, theorists and historians of science, such as Günther
Abel, Karl-Otto Apel, Babette Babich, Gaston Bachelard, Nancy Cartwright,
Peter Caws, Bob Crease, Martin Eger, Jacques Ellul, Paul Feyerabend, Dagfinn
Føllesdal, Dieter Freundlieb, Steve Fuller, Carl F. Gethmann Ronald Giere,
Nietzsche, The Gay Science, §112; KSA, Vol. 3.
Ibid.
23
Nietzsche, BGE §14; KSA Vol. 5.
24
See Hans Vaihinger’s The Philosophy of “As If.” I discuss Vaihinger and Nietzsche together with
the philosopher of chemistry and early interpreter of Nietzsche and science, Alwin Mittasch in
Babich (1994). For a related discussion but particularly with refernce to Robert Julius Mayer, see
Günter Abel (1998).
25
Gadamer had already written about Nietzsche and hermeneutics some time ago along with Paul
Ricoeur and Gianni Vattimo, in addition, of course, to almost everyone who has ever written on
Nietzsche and interpretation. And anyone concerned with Nietzsche and science was perforce
reflecting upon yet another dimension of hermeneutic phenomenology, to wit Vaihinger as well as
Mittasch but also Walter del Negro and Reinhardt Löw, Jean Granier, Friedrich Kaulbach,
Wolfgang Müller-Lauter and others. Several collections have appeared drawing out the lines of
Nietzsche and phenomenology, most recently and most comprehensively, Élodie Boubil and
Christine Daigle (2012).
21
22
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Dimitri Ginev, Trish Glazebrook, Ian Hacking, Lee Hardy, Patrick Heelan, Kurt
Hübner, Peter Janich, Pierre Kerszberg, Ted Kisiel, Joseph J. Kockelmans, Bruno
Latour, Hans Lenk, Reinhard Löw, Nordmann, Gerard Radnitzky, Joseph Rouse,
Thomas Seebohm, Michel Serres, Isabel Stengers, Bas C. van Fraassen, and Carl
Friedrich von Weizsäcker, John Ziman, among many others. Although hardly to
be reduced to any one tradition, if only to the extent that each of the above
names—and many more could be added—represent philosophical approaches in
their own right, along with their own specializations, this broad range of hermeneutic phenomenological approaches to the history and philosophy of science is
highlighted to an astonishing degree in Joseph J. Kockelmans’ (1923–2008) several approaches to the philosophy of science beginning with a concern with the
history and philosophy of mathematics26 and physics27 and, as he himself
emphasizes,28 with Husserl.29 On his own account of this and after his initial
work in the philosophy of mathematical physics, Kockelmans’ intellectual development works through Merleau-Ponty30 as well as Heidegger’s philosophical
reflections on science in Being and Time and throughout his later writings
(including Heidegger’s reflections on art),31 before Kockelmans goes on to offer
his own overview in his two-volume study, the first volume published in 1993
and the second volume almost a decade later in 2002: Ideas for a Hermeneutic
Phenomenology of the Natural Sciences.32
Heidegger had argued that reflective or meditative thinking or philosophy is—
meaning that it both presupposes and that it entails—questioning. In this questioning and therefore hermeneutic sense, the Heidegger of 1929/1930 is able to contend
that “all science is perhaps only a servant with respect to philosophy.”33 The same
spirit of this early suggestion can be heard in the later Heidegger’s provocative

Joseph J. Kockelmans (1953).
Kockelmans (1958, 1962).
28
See for this emphasis: Kockelmans, Ideas for a Hermeneutic Phenomenology of the Natural
Sciences, pp. ix ff.
29
See for example, Kockelmans (in Dutch) on Husserl’s Phenomenological Psychology (1964), in
English as Edmund Husserl’s Phenomenological Psychology. A Historico-Critical Study
(Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1967) as well as his “Husserl’s Original View on
Phenomenological Psychology,” Phenomenological Psychology Phaenomenologica, Vol. 10, 3
(1987): 3–29. See too Kockelmans’ monograph on Husserl which begins with a reprint and translation of Husserl’s 1928 article on “Phenomenology” in the Encyclopedia Britannica: Kockelmans
(1994) as well as Kockelmans (1970).
30
Joseph J. Kockelmans (1970) as well as “Merleau-Ponty on Space and Space-Perception,”
Review of Existential Psychology and Psychiatry, 4 (1964)” pp. 69–105.
31
Kockelmans (1985).
32
Kockelmans (1993, 2002).
33
Heidegger 1995, 5. The focus on questioning is the meaning of critique, foregrounded as essential in Kant and post-Kantian thought in Nicholas Rescher’s contribution to the current volume.
See also Richard Tieszen (2005) who emphasizes the importance for Gödel of this likewise
Husserlian emphasis on the role of philosophy.
26
27
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dictum on science in his What is Called Thinking that, and above all: ‘science does
not think.’34
In this sense, the Gadamerian hermeneutic philosopher, Jean Grondin, seemingly
argues that continental philosophy is hermeneutics—as it were—all the way down.35
But traditional practitioners of hermeneutic philosophy have tended to keep themselves well clear of the broad themes of philosophy, especially epistemology but
above all philosophy of science, emphasizing as students of hermeneutics tend to
do, a focus on text rather than practice. The result can lead to misprisions in the
classic debates over the years between Gadamer and Habermas or the debate specifically relevant to the current context, between Patrick Aidan Heelan and György
Markus.36 Markus takes the literary or textual conventional understanding of the
hermeneutic tradition as his point of departure, invoking the “cultural organization
of the Author-Text-Reader relation.”37 Markus then goes on to insist that when it
comes to the philosophy of science, meaning the natural sciences, “writings explicitly addressed to such an undertaking are very rare.”38 But this insistence exemplifies what Nietzsche called the acoustic (ceteris paribus: cognitive) illusion, that
where one hears nothing, there is nothing. Thus if we have not bothered to read
widely— and many of us, even many of the more scholarly among us, do not
bother—we assume that what we have read exhausts the extant texts, which then
allows us to go on to say that such approaches are either nonexistent or rare. The
tendency is self-confirming and convenient. Thereby scholars dispense themselves
from the need to cite other scholars. Coupled with the tendency scholars have to
focus on just a few names at the tip of the fashionable disciplinary iceberg, the attention deficit disorder Nietzsche called a ‘lack of philology’ continues to this day.
Thus and in order to contend in 1987 that there is “No Hermeneutics of Natural
Sciences,” Markus was required not only to overlook Heidegger himself—who
offers a precisely hermeneutic account of the natural sciences and specifically naming physics as such and thereby amplifying Husserl’s phenomenological project for
the sciences in Heidegger’s Being and Time—but also, and more expressly, Heelan’s
1965 monograph on Heisenberg’s philosophy of science,39 as well as Kockelmans’
1966 monograph on the philosophy of physical science (leaving out Kockelmans’

Heidegger, What is Called Thinking, 1968, 8ff. For discussion see Jean-Michel Salanskis (1995),
Babich (2003). Ginev (1997).
35
See Jean Grondin (2000).
36
See here Gyorgy Markus’s patently circular essay: “Why is There No Hermeneutics of Natural
Sciences,” Science in Context, 1/1 (1987), pp. 5–51 as well as Heelan’s patient rejoinder: “There
is a Hermeneutic Philosophy of Natural Science: Rejoinder to Markus.” Science in Context,
3 (1989): 469–480. Largely engaging Markus, see Dimitŭr Ginev (1997). See yet more broadly,
Heelan (1998).
37
Markus, “Why is There No Hermeneutics of Natural Sciences,” 5.
38
Ibid., pp. 5–6.
39
Patrick A. Heelan (1965).
34
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earlier Dutch language studies),40 in addition to, among excluded others, Heidegger’s
successor in Freiburg after the war, the Hungarian philosopher of science, Wilhelm
Szilasi who published a very hermeneutical minded study of science (in Heidegger’s
spirit) in 1945 and focused on related themes until the end of his life.41
The history of the philosophy of science itself, in the meetings of the American
Philosophy of Science Association and in its publications, which in the 1960s
received the work of Kockelmans as it also received Heelan’s contributions with an
openness that was as striking as it would prove to be short-lived, has yet to be
written, but any account would need to review the changing rubrics that rule the
reference to hermeneutics.42 Thus Kockelmans pointed out that he himself originally spoke of “existential phenomenology” and only later came to speak of the
same as “hermeneutic phenomenology”43 and Heelan too would experiment with
context-dependence and interpretation.
Another part of the problem may well be traceable to my own teacher, Hans-Georg
Gadamer himself, who maintained, perhaps because his own father was a well-known
professor of chemistry, a certain distance from the sciences, and who, when he did
engage the sciences in his long life, did little to supersede the effects of this same
distance. Thus Gadamer’s Reason in the Age of Science repeated Dilthey without
going beyond him.44 More troublesome was the conventional distinction lent to
studies of the social sciences (already burdened by the old fact/value distinction as
sciences of spirit in a German context) by authors who did not really introduce
hermeneutics at all into books that were nonetheless so titled, such as Zygmunt
Bauman’s Hermeneutics and Social Science which was rather more of a primer for
anthropological sociology than anything else.45 By contrast, of course, Kockelmans
See Kockelmans (1966), which in turn was a translation of an earlier text written in Dutch:
Phaenomenologie en Natuurwetenschap: een inleiding in de wijsbegeerte der natuurwetenschappen (Haarlem: Erven F. Bohn, 1962).
41
Wilhelm Szilasi (1945) as well as Szilasi (1961).
42
But see Heelan’s own biographical reflections, “Le petit philosoph” for a beginning and a chronological review of Kockelmans’ as indeed of Heelan’s own publications in this matter can also be
revealing.
43
This is also to be seen in the original title for the largest society for the study of continental philosophy in North America, the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy. Some years
ago there was talk of changing the name of the society to reflect not only hermeneutics but other
significant trends. Similar emphases also can be seen in the leading journal for continental philosophy which was originally called Man and World and is now called, obviously enough, The
Continental Philosophy Review.
44
Gadamer (1981). But of course all of this collection is about showing the precise relevance of
Gadamer’s thinking to science as exemplified, just for one example by an essay featuring medical
and nursing professionals among the collective authors: Nancy J. Moules, David W. Jardine,
Graham P. McCaffrey, Christopher B. Brown, “‘Isn’t All of Oncology Hermeneutic?’” Journal of
Applied Hermeneutics, pp. 1–10.
45
Simon Glynn’s concluding essay below offers an exception to this claim. See Zygmunt Bauman’s
(1978) also avoided significant engagement with Gadamer, reading hermeneutics to be sure as a
literary tradition. I should also note that although Richard Bernstein’s study of pragmatism and
hermeneutics invokes science in the title of his book, Bernstein does not in fact speak to philosophy
40
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always sought to include both phenomenology and hermeneutics in his own
discussions of the social sciences.46
By contrast, there are significant signs that things are changing. I read Alfred
Nordmann’s “Getting the Causal Story Right” as an important step in such a direction, interior to mainstream philosophy of science, beyond the continued damage
done by Markus’s limitation of hermeneutics to the “interpretive encounter of a
reader with a text”47 rather than and as Kockelmans himself had read Heidegger’s
hermeneutic transformation of the phenomenological return to Husserl’s things
themselves in the schemes that Heidegger contended made up the region or delimited an individual science qua science, or as Merleau-Ponty saw this as informing
sense-perception including measurement, as Heelan would also argue in both
Heidegger’s and Husserl’s sense, as well as theory.
If Heidegger could call Husserlian phenomenology the Urwissenschaft in 1919,48
his signal contribution was his articulation of an explicitly hermeneutic phenomenology. Thus if the Heidegger of 1925, almost in the very same terms that Husserl
uses, refers to the “crisis of philosophy as science,” he reflects in the same spirit—
and indeed one that will recur almost verbatim in the early section of Being and
Time—that all “sciences and groups of sciences are undergoing a great revolution of
a productive kind that has opened up new modes of questioning, new possibilities,
and new horizons.”49 Heidegger goes on to detail the theory of relativity in physics
along with the crisis of foundations in mathematics, to which one must add quantum
mechanics along with the movement against mechanistic thinking in the biological
sciences. For Heidegger, what is at issue is the constitution of modern technological
and mathematizable (measurable, calculable, model-oriented) science, conceived in
both the Husserlian phenomenological sense and the mechanically explicit sense of
standardized manufacture and institutional technology.50
of science. Similarly, the rhetoric of science can fail to engage the broad tradition of hermeneutics
as can be seen by more rather than less conventional studies such in evidence in monographs and
collections such as Allan G. Gross and William M. Keith (1997). By contrast and although also
analytically inclined Chrysostomos Mantzavinos (2005) offers a systematic approach to what may
count, very provisionally, as a new beginning.
46
Thus see in particular Kockelmans’ important essay: “Toward an Interpretative or Hermeneutic
Social Science,” Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal, 5 (1975): 73–96 as well as his article on
history: “Hermeneutic Phenomenology and the Science of History,” Phiinomenologische
Forschungen, 2 (1976): 130–179, his essays “Reflections on Social Theory,” Human Studies: A
Journal for Philosophy and the Social Sciences, 1 (1978): 1–15 and “Deskriptive und interpretierende Phanomenologie in Schutz’s Konzeption der Sozialwissenschaft” in: Walter Sprondel and
Richard Grathoff, (eds.) Alfred Schutz und die Idee des Alltags in den Sozia/wissenschaften
(Stuttgart: Enke Verlag, 1979) 26–42.
47
Alfred Nordmann’s (2008).
48
Heidegger (2000), p. 3, 11ff . See further Ted Kisiel (2002), 17ff.
49
Heidegger (2002, p. 148).
50
This is a complex point, and later the same Heidegger who will foreground Gelassenheit, suggests
in the 1930s that the trajectory of modern technology may be described as a “humanism” — reading
humanism here as Nietzsche speaks of the human, all too human. See for this reading of
the Beiträge of the 1930s and 1940s, Babich (2012a) as well as my own essay included in the
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But it would be difficult to characterize Joseph Kockelmans’ approach better
than Ted Kisiel has where Kisiel also has recourse to the above-mentioned
distinctions and contrasts to do so:
Contrary to Patrick Heelan and me, Joe K’s hermeneutic approach to the philosophy of
science consistently follows an (to me unremarkable) approach sketched out by MH in SZ
363 of “thematizing objectification” with math physics as its ultimate model, which via
mathematical projection abstracts and demarcates a domain of objects, which it regards as
Nature, for research by way of formalization and other such theoretical systematizations.
All this summarized in his book (Kluwer, 1993) entitled Ideas for a Hermeneutic
Phenomenology of the Natural Sciences.51

To this extent, and as we may, following Kisiel here, review Kockelmans’ own
philosophical trajectory in the philosophy of science, Heidegger himself also followed and complemented Husserl’s own approach to science. In the same way, as
Kockelmans has also foregrounded this conjunction, both Heidegger and Husserl
significantly regarded phenomenology as an approach needed for any philosophy of
science that might come forth as such.52 But in the same spirit, and this is where
many readers of Heidegger’s philosophy of science will tend to shy away, recognizing this as a critical reservation, Heidegger also opposes sense-directed reflection
[Besinnung] to the rational, calculative project of Western technologically articulated and advancing science. Thus Heidegger discusses the relation between science
and philosophy in Being and Time, noting as he does there that philosophical logic
can either ‘limp along’ after the sciences,53 or else it can leap ahead, as a literally
“productive logic.”54 For Heidegger this generative logic that leaps ahead “into
some area of Being, discloses it for the first time, in the constitution of its Being,
and, after thus arriving at the structures within it, makes these available to the positive sciences as transparent assignments for their inquiry.”55
Reflecting on what might be counted as the “future” of hermeneutic philosophy,
the Hegelian Otto Pöggeler, who was along with Bas C. van Fraassen, a contributor
to Tim Stapleton’s edited Festschrift in Kockelmans honor,56 could observe that no
possibility that is not adequately anticipated or met can come to be. What is then
lacking is not a failure of possibility with respect to what has or what might come to

collection below on Heidegger’s 1949/1950 lectures as well as, for a critical account relevant to our
own times, Babich (2012–2013).
51
Ted Kisiel, email to the author. 12:00 AM, 11 June 2013.
52
Indeed although the great majority of the contributions show the dominant influence of analytic
philosophy, the contributions to Carlo Ierna, Hanne Jacobs, and Filip Mattens (2010) illustrate this
point as does R. L. Tieszen (1989) as well as Ginev (1997) and the contributions to Babich (2002a)
as well as Glazebrook (2012).
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Heidegger, Being and Time, 31.
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Heidegger, Being and Time, 30.
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Ibid., 31.
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See the contributions to Timothy Stapleton (1994).
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pass but a deficiency in the prerequisite or condition for the possibility of matching
such a possibility in advance and as point de départ in the present time.57
Kockelmans’ own Ideas for a Hermeneutic Phenomenology of the Natural
Sciences58 begins with a sober recollection of the breadth of his background in his
introduction to this collection, going back indeed to his fairly patently hermeneutic
1958 study on Time and Space.59 Although it bears directly on the issue at hand, i.e.,
although it is precisely relevant to the multifarious dimensionality or dimensionalities of hermeneutic phenomenology of science precisely qua philosophy of science,
there is here no adequate or fitting way to detail the history of reception and lack of
reception, i.e., to explicate the antecedents and consequents of what are (or become)
received viewpoints vs. the unreceived viewpoints that collectively make up the
hermeneutic constellation of what is routinely included within and what is excluded
from what is called philosophy of science. Some of this is due to what is widely
condemned as scientism or the ‘physics envy’ quoted from Rorty above.60 Other
elements are doubtless due to a related trend on the part of analytic philosophy to
bar from its ranks anything, anyone and indeed any themes that might compromise
analytic philosophy’s ongoing effort to be taken as the sole arbiter of science and
reason—even in place of scientists as such—but may also be accounted to the
extreme rigor of hermeneutic phenomenology which from the start conceived its
own approach as scientific, and of the very first rank.
It is in this fashion that Heidegger reflects on the reflexive contradiction of
the claim that “there is no absolute certainty.”61 Like Nietzsche’s claim that
there is no truth (only interpretation), Heidegger does not dispute the argument
countering that this claim advances “a claim to absolute certainty that there is
no absolute certainty.” Nevertheless and just as Nietzsche does not dispute but
much rather encourages the critic who observes that the claim that ‘everything
is interpretation’ is itself an interpretation, the issue for philosophical and logical reflection is exactly, as Heidegger points out, that “this apparently unshakable argument nevertheless carries no weight.”62 At issue is the lived dynamic of
philosophy or “freedom” for Heidegger, a freedom which also corresponds to an
“innermost ambiguity,”63 the same ambiguity that appears in Nietzsche’s writings as “change” or “becoming.” It is because of the “turbulent” freedom of
See here Otto Pöggeler (1994).
Kockelmans (1993).
59
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philosophizing, as human beings must philosophize, everything that belongs to
the human condition “belongs just as essentially to the truth of philosophy.”64
Hence and in a Nietzschean (and indeed Avenarius-cum-Machian) moment
reflecting on the economy of knowledge, Heidegger observes that “No knower
necessarily stands so close to the verge of error at every moment as the one who
philosophizes.”65
For Heidegger—and this reflects the overall spirit of the present collection on
the multidimensionality of hermeneutics—philosophy is called upon to think on
science. But Heidegger also contends not only that science is infamously innocent of thought. And in what we may now see to be an echo of Nietzsche’s
remarks on physics and interpretation in Beyond Good and Evil, Heidegger also
writes in his essay “Science and Reflection,” that “Physics as physics can make
no assertions about physics.”66 To this extent—and this is why hermeneutics cannot be dispensed with, perhaps particularly when it comes the natural sciences—
Heidegger’s objections are, logically, formal ones. Ted Kisiel explains
Heidegger’s gnomic pronouncement on error: “In order to reflect on any science,
it is necessary to transcend that science and adopt a transcendental vantage point,
to put it in Kantian terms.”67 For Heidegger, a scientist philosophizes, with all the
risks of the same, as a philosopher not a scientist when reflecting on the foundations of his own discipline.
When Kockelmans concludes the first volume of his Hermeneutic Phenomenology
of Natural Science by reflecting on the same foundations with respect to the history
and philosophy of science, his point concerns the very conceptual framework of
science as this itself “essentially depends on its mathematical character.”68 In this
sense Kockelmans stresses, as Hilbert had already argued as necessary point of
departure for mathematics as a science, the foundational point Heidegger makes
above, that “mathematics is not a means to express a rationality that is already
there” but much rather that mathematics “constitutes the rationality of our description of the observed phenomena.”69 The essays to follow exemplify this rigor and
above all they testify to the multidimensionality of hermeneutic phenomenology not
only in the philosophy of science but also for the philosophy of technology as well
as metaphysics and epistemology, and including aesthetics, as well as explorations
of the history of philosophy and theology.
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Plan of the Text
In his lead essay, “A Paradox of Cognition” in the first section, Cognition,
Bio-Hermeneutics, and Lifeworld, Nicholas Rescher offers a reflection on the
classical irony of the circumstance that finds us increasingly aware of the limitations
of our knowledge the more we know. Rescher takes his point of departure from
Kant’s observation that every answer to our questions provides new materials for
the development of further questions. As knowledge expands, the lineaments of our
ignorance are brought even more clearly into sight. Questioning is an earmark of
hermeneutic phenomenology. In his essay to follow, Dimitri Ginev turns to a case
study drawn from vectorial biochemistry in his “The Articulation of a Scientific
Domain from the Viewpoint of Hermeneutic Phenomenology: The Case of Vectorial
Metabolism.” Ginev’s case study involves both theoretical objects related to anisotropic processes of trans-membrane transport and objects of inquiry contextually
ready to hand within a configuration of scientific practices, especially including the
hermeneutic fore-structure of scientific research in terms not only of scientific
practices but also hermeneutic and horizontal possibilities as well as spaces of
representation in addition to readable technologies.
The next essays take up the social sciences. Gregor Schiemann in his contribution,
“One Cognitive Style Among Others: Towards a Phenomenology of the Lifeworld
and of Other Experiences,” addresses the work of Alfred Schütz in the phenomenology of the social sciences. Schiemann emphasizes Schütz’s pluralist theory of
experience. Speaking not only on cognitive styles but of the lifeworld as a world of
perception as Husserl expressed it but also of the layer-model of the lifeworld developed by Schütz and Thomas Luckmann, Schiemann shows that “lifeworld” does not
denote a category that encompasses culture or nature but refers to a delimited
action-space and goes on to deploy Schütz’s criterion-catalogue to characterize both
experimental science and subjectivity. Then, in his essay to follow, “Steps Toward a
Postfoundational Phenomenology,” Giovanni Leghissa explores the problem of
historicity together with the paradoxes of foundation for the sake of a more comprehensive inquiry into the concept of lifeworld. Drawing upon Husserl and Blumenberg,
Leghissa explores the relationship between history and the lifeworld as well as the
paradoxes contained in the Krisis. The concluding essays in this first section turn to
practical hermeneutic dimensions in the natural sciences, including the philosophy
of geology as well as measurement. Robert Frodeman discusses “Hermeneutics in
the Field: The Philosophy of Geology,” arguing that geological reasoning provides
a rich and realistic account of both the power and limitations of scientific reasoning.
Frodeman shows that geological reasoning highlights the hermeneutic and historical nature of reasoning, scientific or otherwise, in addition to the neglected kinship
between reasoning in the sciences and the humanities. To conclude this first section,
Robert Crease examines measurement as an ‘emblematic technology’ in his essay,
“The Metroscape: Phenomenology of Measurement.” Reading measurement to
develop and extend Heidegger’s concept of Gestell, Crease argues that measurement is more than one tool among others, such as rulers, scales, and other
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instruments, measurement is a fluid and correlated network that is smoothly and
intimately integrated into the world and its shape. This essay proposes the concept
of metroscape to develop and extend Heidegger’s concept of Gestell.
The second of the four sections in this collection, “Hermeneutic and
Phenomenological Philosophy of Science and Technology” begins with a lead essay
by Patrick Aidan Heelan, “Consciousness, Quantum Physics, and Hermeneutical
Phenomenology” who begins with a powerful metaphor comparing Friedrich
Schleiermacher’s ‘hermeneutic’ transformation of Kant’s anthropology, in order to
include then-newly discovered peoples that Captain Cook had discovered in the
South Sea Islands to Kockelmans effort to update Kant’s notion of natural science
to include the phenomenological lifeworld syntheses of classical, relativity, and
quantum physics. In this hermeneutical move, the ‘observer’ is ‘embodied consciousness’ and ‘measure-numbers’ represent ‘observable presence.’ For Heelan, the
quantum notion of an “observable” introduces into the discursive language of physics the common sense lifeworld notion of “contextuality” as Heelan himself had
earlier developed the notion of a context-dependent logic. In the next essay, Michael
Stoelzner begins by noting that usual treatments of Nietzsche’s thesis of eternal
recurrence tend to highlight its ethical or anthropological rather than its more scientific aspects. Yet Stoelzner reminds us that this was not always so and during the first
half of the twentieth century, several eminent scholars treated eternal recurrence as
a serious, if speculative, scientific idea, either to justify its validity or to find it
worthy of an elaborated criticism within the science of the day. Stoelzner reviews
Oskar Becker’s 1936 effort to defend the scientific and logical basis of Nietzsche’s
writings, noting that although Becker endorses Abel Rey’s Le retour éternel et la
philosophie de la physique (1927), he neglects the work of the mathematician Felix
Hausdorff, particularly his Das Chaos in kosmischer Auslese (published in 1898
under the pseudonym Paul Mongré). Stoelzner’s offers a balanced overview of
Becker’s arguments against the backdrop of Rey’s and Hausdorff’s considerations,
concluding that these severely constrain Becker’s conclusions. For Stoelzner,
Becker’s argument rests upon the constructivist standpoint in the foundations of
mathematics and the Heideggerian underpinning of it by the temporality of mathematical thought that he had already given in his 1927 Mathematische Existenz. But
Becker also assumes that, for periodic motions, one can (in thought) reverse the
order of time. A look at Hausdorff’s book and a proto-set-theoretic argument
presented there shows, however, that such a reversal does not work without invoking
what Hausdorff calls transcendent reality. From this set-theoretical and cosmological perspective, the rest of the contributions in this section take up Heidegger and
technology, beginning with Theodore Kisiel’s essay “Heidegger and Our Twenty-
first Century Experience of Ge-Stell,” where he proposes an etymological translation
of Ge-Stell, Heidegger’s word for the essence of modern technology, from its Greek
and Latin roots as “syn-thetic com-posit[ion]ing.” For Kisiel, the virtue of such a
compound translation shows that Heidegger’s Ge-Stell presciently portends our
twenty-first century experience of what Kisiel calls “the internetted WorldWideWeb,”
with its virtual infinity of ‘websites’ in ‘cyberspace,’ but also Global Positioning
Systems, interlocking air traffic control grids, world-embracing weather maps, the

Introduction

xxix

24/7 world news coverage of cable TV networks like CNN, etc.,—all of which are
structured by the complex programming based on the computerized and ultimately
simple Leibnizian binary-digital logic generating an infinite number of c ombinations
of the posit (1) and non-posit (0). Kisiel argues that the sharp contrast between the
global time-space technologically foreshortened into instantaneity and simultaneity
and the radically local time-space of our situated historical existence illuminates
nothing less than the temporal-spatial tension between Ge-Stell and Da-Sein and
Kisiel accordingly seeks to bring them together in contemporaneous compatibility.
In my own essay to follow, “Constellating Technology: Heidegger’s Die Gefahr/The
Danger,” I revisit the original 1949 lectures to the Club of Bremen. I argue that a
hermeneutic not only of Heidegger’s reflections on technology but the context in
which he offered his lecture series can offer insight into some of the more controversial passages in these texts. Like Kisiel, I too advert to today’s media context,
particularly the ecology of modern technicized consciousness (and here I underline
that we are still in need of a greater integration of Heidegger’s thinking and critical
theory), as well as the increasing real-world ecological pressures of our own day to
rethink, once again, the related notions of event [Ereignis] and ownedness
[Eigentlichkeit]. Lin Ma and Jaap van Brakel, in their jointly authored essay,
“Heidegger’s Thinking on the ‘Same’ of Science and Technology,” begin by noting
that as opposed to the common view that modern technology derives from modern
science, Heidegger presents a reverse picture in which science originated in the
essence of technology, wherein Being speaks. Ma and van Brakel contend that in
this sense Heidegger speaks of the Same [das Selbe] of science and technology as
ultimately grounded in the history of Being. From 1938 to the end of his life in
1976, Heidegger constantly explored the question concerning the relation of science
and technology and kept himself well-informed of both traditional and new types of
technology and science, including quantum physics, nuclear technology, and
biophysics. Ma and van Brakel argue however that one cannot ascribe to the
Heidegger the view that these new developments originate a new Epoch of Being.
In his concluding contribution to the first half of this collection, “Logos and the
Essence of Technology,” Holger Schmid contends that current convictions that
nature is not ‘nature’ but social construction corresponds to the self-accomplishment
of metaphysical Platonism, thereby opening a common hermeneutic horizon for
two articles of Heideggerian doctrine: namely, that technology has a n on-technological
‘essence’ and that the final outbreak of the ‘principle of reason’ follows an incubation period of more than two millennia. What thus unfolds for Schmid is the
philosophic history of the word ‘logos’: not speech, as Heidegger rightly urges, but
‘laying.’ In this fashion, and including important references to Wilhelm von
Humboldt on language and, more subtly, to Friedrich Georg Jünger on technology,
Schmid continues to argue that today’s technoscientific world view increasingly
determines the way reality is perceived, privileging the framework of the natural as
opposed to the human sciences.
The second half of the collection begins with the section Philosophical Truth,
Hermeneutic Aesthetics, and History of Philosophy. Graeme Nicholson, in his lead
essay here, “On the Manifold Meaning of Truth in Aristotle,” makes the case that
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when Aristotle treats true and false statements in his logical treatises, what is
demonstrated is that truth and falsity are the pre-supposed, non-discursive grounding for statements themselves. Nicholson goes on to note that it is even more salient
that Aristotle’s ethical treatises show that intellectual virtues are constituted by
truth whereas the Metaphysics shows that truth in thinking is sustained by the truth
of being. As Nicholson argues, these diverse studies can be connected to one
another by way of the Greek term for truth, aletheia, as Heidegger has treated it.
Jeff Malpas’ essay, “The Twofold Character of Truth: Heidegger, Davidson,
Tugendhat,” continues Nicholson’s focus on the concept of truth as aletheia, or
‘unconcealment.’ Malpas differs from Nicholson’s analysis in that he places his
emphasis on Tugendhat’s influential criticism of Heidegger’s identification of truth
with aletheia together with Donald Davidson’s account. Malpas seeks to show why
it remains the case that aletheia is to be understood as a mode of truth, arguing that
this involves understanding a certain transcendental-topological structure as pertaining to aletheia, thereby understanding truth as standing in an essential relation
to place or topos constituting the ground for genuine questioning or critique. In his
essay, “What can Philosophy of Science Learn from Hermeneutics—What Can
Hermeneutics Learn From Philosophy of Science?” Jan Faye challenges the traditional supposition that hermeneutics and phenomenology were the dominant positions in the philosophy of the humanities, whereby the validity of these constitutive
acts of meaning depended on the historical situation of the interpreter and of the
object of interpretation. Although agreeing with the h ermeneutic-phenomenological
tradition, Faye proposes a view of interpretation and understanding resting on the
idea that human cognition is a natural phenomenon. Thus Faye argues that objective
understanding exists in the humanities in the sense whereby the validity of an
interpretation, like an explanation in the sciences, is independent of the interpreter’s historical situation. As the concluding contribution to this section, Enrico
Berti’s “The Classical Notion of Person and its Criticism by Modern Philosophy”
illustrates the definition of person given by Boethius as “an individual substance of
a rational nature,” and as derived from Aristotle. Berti explores the criticisms of
this notion formulated by both modern and contemporary philosophers from David
Hume to Derek Parfit and details the rediscovery of the classical notion of person,
or of its Aristotelian elements, by Saul Kripke, David Wiggins, Paul Ricoeur, and
Martha C. Nussbaum.
The concluding section, Hermeneutic Science and First Philosophy, Theology,
Hermetics and the Universe, begins with a contribution that recollects the purview
of the collection as a whole. In his essay, “Philosophie des sciences et philosophie
première”, Pierre Kerszberg argues that ever since the institution of Galilean
science, the mathematical science of nature has wanted to surmount the deceptive
appearances of everyday experience. Yet reference to familiar experience is insurmountable even for contemporary theory. Kerszberg, thus undertakes the project of
first philosophy in terms of the horizon of a mathesis universalis in order to explore
the possibilities of an epistemology that eliminates both the fantasy of absolute
control of what is as well as the skepticism that inevitably follows the frustration
of the same fantasy. For Kerszberg, Kant’s transcendental phenomenology opens
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a path to such, including the contributions of modern and contemporary science to
invent kinds of evidence that would engage anew the gestures of the body translated
into the spaces of thought. Adriaan T. Peperzak’s “A Re-Reading of Heidegger’s
“Phenomenology and Theology” in dialogue with Kockelmans own engagement
with theology raises the question of the status of both science and theology,
motivated by critical questions concerning his basic statements about the presence
and absence of certain relations between faith and philosophy. Perperzak invokes
traditional theological debates as well as a reflection on Franz Overbeck, usually
noted in connection with Nietzsche but who was important for many contemporary
debates on theology.
In the penultimate article in this collection, “The Remainders of Faith: On Karl
Löwith’s Conception of Secularization,” Rodolphe Gasché’s essay explores
Löwith’s notion of secularization. Gasché argues that this notion presupposes a
conception of faith found only in the religions of the Book. For Gasché, Löwith’s
analyses of history, no matter whether eschatological or progressive, are adumbrated against the background of the Greek experience of the physical cosmos as
this is characterized by cyclical time. The final contribution by Simon Glynn, “The
Hermeneutics of God, the Universe, and Everything,” offers a comprehensively
global perspective on hermeneutic interpretation as a means of clarifying and
resolving apparent incoherencies and contradictions within the scriptures, legal,
classical, and other texts. Explicating such wide-ranging application within these
diverse fields of human inquiry, Glynn concludes, along with Heidegger, that
hermeneutic interpretation is central to all epistemological understanding, as it is to
human existence.
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